Türkiye is aggressively leveraging its presence in post-Assad Syria to establish regional hegemony but faces intensifying competition and external resistance that jeopardize its strategic ambitions.
The Post-Assad Power Vacuum and Türkiye’s Move
The collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024 has created a scramble for influence, prompting a reshuffling of the regional balance of power. As Türkiye moves away from traditional allies, it increasingly seeks to become the Middle Eastern hegemon over historical competitors Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Iran, the critical support of the Assad regime and a once-dominant force in Syrian affairs, has rapidly lost its foothold in Syria. The new status quo, under Türkiye’s purview, particularly goes against broader Iranian regional ambitions. Iranian supply lines to its militias across the Levant have broken down, leading to a decline in its influence. Russia, too, has lost, considering its closeness with the former regime and access to military installations that provided significant regional influence.
Türkiye has moved swiftly to fill this space, expanding its political, military, and economic reach in pursuit of a durable regional influence. Unlike Iran’s approach, which relied on ideological militias and loyalty to a regime, Türkiye is advancing a strategy based on formal governance, integrated economic systems, and strategic diplomacy. However, the nation must balance against encroachments from outside interests, like the Saudis. Whether Syria is ready or not, it now appears central to Ankara’s long-term vision as a potential new hegemon over Middle Eastern affairs.
A Different Model of Power
Ankara’s model in Syria focuses on legitimizing its influence through administration and state-building. The Syrian Transitional Government (STG), backed by Türkiye, is the primary administrative authority in former regime-held areas. Turkish backing is evident in staffing, logistics, and security coordination. Türkiye has not just been backing Syrian factions but has also transformed Syrian institutions with this model.
One part of this transformation involved the quiet rehabilitation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). To distance itself from jihadist origins and gain international legitimacy, leader al-Jolani began operating under his original name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, signaling a break with the past. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan acknowledged cooperation with HTS while designated as a terrorist group in secrecy before the regime change. Türkiye’s work with HTS being kept quiet reflected a deeper trend as it began moving beyond the boundaries set by its Western allies in pursuit of its regional design.
Recalibrating Global Ties: Moving Away from NATO
Turkish sensitivities were not unfounded and were particularly directed at its traditional Western allies. Over the past decade, Ankara has become more assertive in pursuing its interests, often acting outside the NATO framework. Disagreements over support for Kurdish militias, disputes with key NATO members, and unilateral Turkish military ventures have gradually weakened traditional alignments.
Beyond its prior track record, the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) faced difficulties even under Turkish sponsorship. Both international and Syrian stakeholders, concerned about how the new government would take shape, demanded an inclusive and representative structure. While inclusivity was not a priority for Türkiye, mounting external pressure compelled the alliance to concede. This shift has diluted Türkiye’s influence over the emerging government.
At the same time, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by the United States but considered a hostile actor by Türkiye, further undermines Turkish leverage. This alignment introduces a paradox in which NATO supports a group its own member vehemently opposes. Although Türkiye remains within NATO, its actions increasingly suggest a repositioning. Ankara is cultivating new partnerships with states like Qatar and the UAE while recalibrating its ties with Western powers. In this context, Syria is more than a national security concern; it is a proving ground for Ankara’s broader ambitions to operate as an autonomous regional power, unbound by Cold War-era alignments. Yet such fluidity has left Syria increasingly vulnerable to competing interests.
“Türkiye is no longer reacting to power shifts in the Middle East but instead seeking to incite them”.
Economic Anchoring Begins in the North
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Türkiye is also building influence through reconstruction and commerce. In northern Syria, where earlier incursions created a buffer zone along the edge of Kurdish SDF-held territory, Turkish firms have been operating for years. These firms have developed their acumen in a high-risk environment, gaining experience that positions them to shape Syria’s postwar economy.
Turkish efforts to push for sanctions relief focused on demonstrating political and economic viability. But without a guarantee from the EU or US, Türkiye moved first, restoring full economic ties with Syria unilaterally. With sanctions formally lifted in May 2025, Turkish firms face fewer barriers than ever, and many are now preparing to scale operations and consolidate influence.
Accordingly, a USD 7 billion power grid restoration deal, highway repairs, and the development of organized industrial zones are just some of the Turkish-backed projects now underway. These initiatives create jobs, stabilize key towns, and tie local economies closer to Turkish markets. Trade between the two countries has surged, and Turkish banks like Ziraat are preparing to expand services deeper into Syria. Such economic integration strengthens Türkiye’s position and makes its presence more difficult to dislodge, especially as other actors re-enter the scene.
Yet the stakes go beyond infrastructure. The semiautonomous Kurdish region of Rojava holds key resources like oil, gas, and agriculture. The Jazira region alone produces a large share of Syria’s wheat and cotton and contains major oil fields like Rmelan. For Türkiye and Syria, access to this territory is essential to any meaningful reconstruction effort. That urgency intensified in March 2025 when the SDF and Damascus reached a deal to integrate the Kurdish-led forces into state institutions. The agreement gave the Syrian government joint control over border crossings, airports, and energy infrastructure in the northeast.
For Türkiye, the message is clear: control over the north means control over Syria’s economic future. Investment now doubles as development policy, a buffer against political volatility, and a tool to entrench influence through infrastructure and market presence.
Israel’s Expanding Role and Ankara’s Calculations
As Iran loses ground and Russia pulls back, Israel has expanded its military operations inside Syria in ways that threaten Turkish hegemony. Airstrikes have ramped up, targeting not just Iranian remnants but also Assad-aligned infrastructure, including positions in areas now tied to Turkish-backed groups. These strikes are shaping the field as others reposition, and they serve as a reminder that Israel won’t sit back while new actors entrench near its borders.
At the same time, Druze unrest in Suwayda has grown into a broader rejection of Damascus, raising real questions about governance in the south. Protests over economic conditions have shifted into calls for self-rule, with some factions openly distancing themselves from the regime. Israel, with its close ties to the Druze community, has taken a careful but deliberate approach, offering quiet support, signaling red lines, and moving to contain any spillover near the Golan. Coordination with Türkiye has become necessary, mainly to avoid miscalculation. For now, Israel appears willing to tolerate Türkiye’s role, provided Ankara restrains HTS activity and avoids triggering instability near Israeli lines. But the balance is delicate. If Turkish-backed forces feed unrest or create new threats, Israel’s posture could shift fast.
Emerging Friction with Saudi Arabia
Other local rivals further contest Türkiye’s race for influence. Namely, Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, both threaten Turkish influence over Syria. For example, the two paid off the previous regime’s debt to the World Bank, enabling more outside reconstruction efforts and positioning itself as a real competitor.
While Saudi Arabia has cautiously welcomed the fall of Iran’s influence in Syria, Türkiye’s rapid rise will create a new set of concerns. Riyadh has long positioned itself as a central actor in Arab affairs, and Ankara’s assertive role in post-Assad Syria could be seen as encroachment. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have temporarily aligned on some reconstruction efforts, but their strategic visions differ beneath the surface. Türkiye promotes Sunni political movements with strong local roots, such as the STG and rebranded Islamist groups, while Saudi Arabia favors a top-down, conservative Islamic governance model. These divergent preferences may lead to rivalry over shaping Syria’s future governance and political identity.
Moreover, all countries see Syria as a gateway to broader influence in the Levant. Control over trade corridors, reconstruction contracts, and security zones could primarily pit Turkish and Saudi interests against each other just as foreign investment resumes and more players re-enter the Syrian theater. Competition and tensions will only grow, especially as Ankara seeks to reduce Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence in favor of its own.
A New Regional Configuration
Türkiye is no longer reacting to power shifts in the Middle East but instead seeking to incite them. Whether Türkiye succeeds will depend less on military reach and more on its ability to embed influence over the fractured region. In Syria, that test has already begun.
Yet challenges remain, such as Israel’s security concerns, the uncertain ideological evolution of HTS, and the possibility of friction with Saudi Arabia, which could complicate Türkiye’s planned trajectory. Nevertheless, it appears clear that Türkiye is no longer operating at the margins and is instead positioning itself as the new power of the Levant. If Türkiye can sustain this strategy, it may not shape just the future of Syria but the broader balance of power in the Middle East.
Cover Image: https://www.lifo.gr/now
